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1. Introduction 
The republican demand for the abolition of endemic domination cannot be met without a 
radical transformation of economic life. Our best hope of securing this, so I shall argue, is a 
socialist programme. Conversely, republicanism offers a compelling account of unfreedom 
under capitalism, which socialists can use to articulate their own emancipatory ambitions. 
Thus, there is good reason for both socialists and republicans to pursue a socialist 
republicanism. 
Socialism and republicanism can, however, seem like odd bedfellows. The civic 
republican tradition has often been denounced as aristocratic and elitist, with an ingrained 
suspicion of democratic rule.1 Ancient republicans were willing to accept the subordination of 
slaves, women, and foreigners as the price to be paid for the liberty of male citizens.2 So too, 
these republicans inveigh against property taxes, while telling us that the function of citizenship 
is the defence of property. In the modern era, republicans have denied such citizenship to those 
who lack economic independence, as well as asserting the rights of masters over their servants. 
Furthermore, some contemporary civic republicans advocate curbs on the power of labour 
unions and champion competitive markets as a way to reduce domination. Republican political 
thought is not, then, the most obvious partner for socialist movements.3 The feeling can also 
be mutual, with the revolutionary hopes and collectivist orientation of many socialists likely to 
trouble those civic republicans who are committed to the rule of law and wary of 
majoritarianism.4 
Nevertheless, recent work in the history of political thought is showing the two 
traditions need not be at loggerheads, and can instead provide complementary diagnoses and 
remedies for the ills of capitalist societies. This radical republican history has found its most 
successful expression in republican readings of Marx and the recovery of a nineteenth century 
labor republican movement.5 We shall also see there is an overlooked republican thread 
running through early twentieth century socialism in Britain and the United States. The 
retrieval of this radical history of republicanism has been taking place alongside contemporary 
republican arguments for workplace democracy, the right to strike, and a political economy 
hostile to laissez-faire capitalism.6 Can these radical republican materials be used to construct 
an attractive, theoretically incisive, and defensible political philosophy? 
My aim is to show how a socialist republicanism fulfills this ambition. Indeed, I shall 
argue that the socialist goal of public ownership and control of the means of production is the 
most promising institutional foundation for a society which suppresses domination and enables 
popular government over our social and economic life. In short, the path to a mature 
republicanism should also lead us to socialism. Conversely, republicanism offers socialists an 
astute understanding of freedom, which puts talk of ‘wage-slavery’ and ‘economic despotism’ 
on a firm theoretical footing, while opening up a richer vision of the lineaments of a free 
society. 
In order to establish the compatibility and complementarity of republicanism and 
socialism, we first need some grasp of their central commitments. Classical republicans lauded 
the liberty of a citizenry which was neither subject to external rule nor under the power of a 
tyrant. Absolutism was rejected for mixed government, and the republican polity was to be 
underpinned by both the rule of law and political institutions fostering active citizens 
committed to the common good rather than their own private or factional interests.7 The 
touchstone of contemporary republicanism has been the adoption of a neo-roman conception 
of liberty which contrasts freedom with a condition of domination, in which someone falls 
under the arbitrary power of a master. This allows neo-republicans to identify unfreedoms 
which do not take the form of outright interference, and which instead arise from someone’s 
vulnerability to power which can be exercised over them with impunity, even if it is presently 
held in reserve. Thus, the slave who must always be mindful of her master’s power is unfree, 
whether or not the master happens not to his enforce his will, because she acts only at his 
indulgence rather than under her own singular power. 
Turning briefly to socialism: it implies both social control over the means of production 
and a commitment to egalitarian political democracy. I do not want to be too prescriptive at 
this initial stage, but when we return to the nature of this social control, I shall defend a further 
specification of socialist commitments in contradistinction to left-liberal alternatives such as 
property-owning democracy. 
A socialist republicanism which fuses these two traditions must first reckon with 
conservative tendencies in classical republican thought. I shall, however, argue that republican 
support for private property, political disenfranchisement, and market-based solutions to 
domination is far from indispensable. Conversely, the relatively neglected radical history of 
republicanism provides powerful conceptual resources for critiquing capitalism and revealing 
the prerequisites of an emancipated society. I contribute a further chapter to this emerging story 
by showing how early twentieth century socialists in America and Britain reached for a 
republican vocabulary to condemn the economic subordination of workers. The foregoing 
radical history then informs a socialist republicanism which takes public ownership and 
economic democracy to be foundations for a society truly capable of subduing dominating 
power. I defend this approach from both the Marxist objection that it overlooks the impersonal 
nature of domination under capitalism and the left-liberal objections that milder measures of 
worker codetermination or property-owning democracy are sufficient to suppress dominating 
relationships. Finally, I outline proposals for moving towards a socialist republicanism without 
simply substituting public domination for private domination. The resulting socialist 
republicanism identifies the need for more ambitious institutional grounds for republican 
liberty than is often supposed, while offering us a distinctive emancipatory justification for 
socialism. 
 
2. Reactionary Republicanism? 
The first major obstacle to socialist republicanism is the charge that the republican tradition is 
irredeemably reactionary. John McCormick tells us, “Republicanism, in ancient and modern 
political theory and practice, guarantees the privileged position of elites more than it facilitates 
political participation by the general populace”.8 Considering the writings of ancient 
republicans like Cicero can help confirm this gloomy view, since he arraigns himself against 
property taxes – a measure which would lessen socioeconomic inequality.9 Furthermore, he 
opposes both agrarian reform and debt forgiveness on the grounds that they would be unfair 
and disrupt civic concord, thereby undermining the foundations of political community. Cicero 
concludes, “it is the proper function of a citizenship and a city to ensure for everyone a free 
and unworried guardianship of his possessions”. 10 
McCormick’s concerns about explicitly political participation also have some 
foundation. Take James Harrington’s division of the populace into those “freemen or citizens”, 
who “live of themselves”, and “servants” who live in servitude to others. The condition of the 
latter is taken to be “inconsistent with freedom or participation of government in a 
commonwealth.”11 Here we see the economically dependent being politically disenfranchised. 
Algernon Sidney not only shares this political commitment but furthermore defends 
private economic power.12 After assuring us that so long as no harm is done to the public, “I 
am protected in the peaceable enjoyment and innocent use of what I possess”, he claims that 
“if there be a contest between me and my servant concerning my service, I only am to decide 
it: He must serve me in my own way, or be gone if I think fit, tho he serve me never so well”.13 
Sidney is here championing what we would now call ‘at-will employment’, while affirming 
the residual authority of employers. 
Are such economic commitments a relic of early modern political thought which fall 
away in an avowedly egalitarian neo-republicanism? The recently articulated commercial 
republicanism of Robert Taylor suggests not, since he explicitly endorses a “move to right-to-
work laws and universal at-will employment” in order to eliminate “closed-shop unionism and 
related ‘for cause’ dismissal”, which he takes to expose employers to “union abuse”.14 This 
underpins market-led strategies for reducing domination, with Taylor arguing, “a republican 
economic program should be primarily focused on promoting competitive conditions”, since 
“perfect competition is a translation of the rule of law into the economic sphere”.15  
While Taylor’s position is an outlier in contemporary republican economic thinking, it 
shares some of the market-friendly sentiments of the leading republican political philosopher, 
Philip Pettit, who insists, “far from threatening republican freedom, the market can reduce 
dependency and domination”.16 For instance, Pettit explains that “in a well-functioning labor 
market […] no one would depend on any particular master and so no one would be at the mercy 
of a master: he or she could move on to employment elsewhere in the event of suffering 
arbitrary interference”.17 Likewise, he warns us of the danger to “small entrepreneurs” who are 
“held to ransom by the primary or secondary picketing of a powerful trade union that can put 
them out of business”.18  
Why then should socialists take a second look at a republican tradition whose members 
have variously defended the security of private property, political disenfranchisement of the 
economically dependent, at-will employment, and market society, while disdaining property 
taxes, land reform, debt cancellation, and strong labour unions? In short, none of these 
commitments are integral to intelligibly republican political thought. 
Consider again Cicero’s discussion of property. Would socialising property amount to a 
failure to ensure each citizen “free and unworried guardianship of his possessions”, in ways 
raising republican concerns about domination? While the capacity to dispossess someone can 
readily seem like dominating power, the ability of a community to expropriate private property 
is not inevitably arbitrary. When the members of an association can impose legislation on 
themselves redistributing or socialising property in pursuit of their common interests, subject 
to procedural safeguards, vigorous institutional oversight, and democratic accountability, 
without thereby immiserating its original owners, then such a power is drained of much of its 
potentially dominating character (although, as we shall see, further safeguards are needed to 
sufficiently minimise public domination by the state). 
Nor do republicans have to endorse disenfranchisement of economic dependents. 
Harrington and Sidney are right to identify a tension between subordination to others and free 
citizenship, since you do not possess perfect political liberty when those who support you 
economically can also impoverish you if they dislike your behaviour. But an egalitarian 
republicanism will look to measures to eliminate or reduce the original economic vulnerability 
rather than recommending disenfranchisement.  
Finally, nothing in the republican approach demands market-based measures: their 
desirability for republicans depends on whether they curb domination. We shall see shortly that 
there are radical republican grounds for deep scepticism about the use of markets to organise 
central areas of human concern like labour and housing. Nevertheless, Sam Gindin’s comments 
on the place of markets under socialism are salutary: 
praising the voluntary and efficient nature of markets apart from the underlying social 
relations in which they’re embedded fetishizes markets. But markets are also fetishized 
when they are rejected as an absolute and treated as having a life of their own 
independent of those underlying relations. 19 
The same lesson goes for socialist republicanism. While markets do not have to be baked into 
a republican political economy, they may have a circumscribed place in a socialist republican 
prospectus in circumstances when they could provide a valuable depersonalisation and 
diffusion of economic power. 
 
3. Radical Republicanism 
Republicanism need not be fundamentally reactionary. Yet, are there reasons to identify 
positive affinities between socialism and republicanism? Historians of political thought are 
uncovering a rich seam of nineteenth-century radical republicanism that shows how republican 
ideas have been used to critique the unfreedom of workers in capitalist societies.20 For instance, 
some affinity with republicanism is intimated by Marx’s prodigious use of the language of 
slavery to characterise the condition of workers, his description of the English peasantry as “a 
servile rabble dependent on the arbitrary will of the landlords”, and defence of a “Social 
Republic” in which the power of the capitalist and landowner class is supplanted by the 
Commune.21 
Stronger evidence can be found in the deep structure of much early socialist thought. 
Bruno Leipold has drawn attention to Auguste Blanqui’s claim that the usurpation of 
productive property by the rich means that workers, 
though not condemned to remain slaves of any given individual, nevertheless 
become absolutely dependent on that caste, since their only remaining freedom is 
the choice of which master will rule over them22 
Similarly, Engels tells us that the worker is “not the slave of a particular individual, but of the 
whole property-holding class” to whom “he is forced to sell himself” piecemeal.23 Marx too 
points to the “absolute dependence of the working class upon the capitalist class”.24 We 
encounter here a class-based conception of dominating dependence which results from falling 
within the power of a dominating group rather than subjection to a single powerful individual. 
Personal domination between individuals does not fall out of this picture, however, since 
class domination creates conditions in which it thrives. While workers are said to be “slaves of 
the bourgeois class”, Marx and Engels claim their enslavement is “above all, by the individual 
bourgeois manufacturer”.25 More darkly, Engels recapitulates the structure of the republican 
analysis of domination when he describes the effective jus primae noctis of the master in the 
factory, whose indiscriminate power to fire the girls working for him enables not only 
economic but sexual exploitation: “his mill is also his harem; and the fact that not all 
manufacturers use their power, does not in the least change the position of the girls.” 26 In other 
words, the girls are dominated even if the master chooses not to abuse his arbitrary power. 
Thus, we see the translation of class domination into personal domination of individual workers 
by individual proprietors. 
Thinkers associated with the Knights of Labor in late nineteenth-century North America 
have an even stronger republican pedigree.27 Their Journal of United Labor even recycles lines 
from Sidney: 
SLAVERY – The weight of chains, number of stripes, hardness of labor, and other 
effects of a master’s cruelty, may make one servitude more miserable than another; but 
he is a slave who serves the gentlest man in the world, as well as he who serves the 
worst; and he does serve him if he must obey his commands and depend upon his will.28 
In a similar vein, the Journal also tells us, “when a man is placed in a position where he is 
compelled to give the benefit of his labor to another, he is in a condition of slavery, whether 
the slave is held in chattel bondage or in wages bondage, he is equally a slave.”29 Wage-slaves 
had more latitude than chattel slaves, but were still rendered unfree by their systemic 
dependence on the owners of productive assets like land and tools. Workers in the new 
industrial economy were thus said to have been “driven, from necessity” to sell their labour to 
these owners.30 
Alex Gourevitch coins the term ‘structural domination’ to describe this phenomenon. 
He says: “Structural is the appropriate word [for the domination of these workers] because it 
was a form of domination arising from the background structure of property ownership and 
because the compulsion they felt did not force them to work for a specific individual.”31 
Structural domination happens when someone’s socio-structural position leaves them without 
a reasonable alternative to being subjected to a master.32 In structural domination, “an unequal 
structure of control over productive assets” leads to workers being “dominated by a number of 
agents, but not any single, given agent in particular.”33 So understood, structural domination 
compels the worker into a contract of employment, and then the arbitrary power of a particular 
boss leaves them personally dominated once they are so contracted. To avoid this, ‘labor 
republicans’ proposed and implemented forms of cooperative labour, intended to make workers 
their own masters, rather than subordinating them to the authority of the owners of productive 
assets.34 Despite some remarkable successes in the late nineteenth century, these attempts at 
building a ‘cooperative commonwealth’ eventually fizzled out along with the Knights of Labor 
themselves. 
It is seldom noticed that the republican influence on radical politics does not end here, 
and instead continues into the twentieth century. Consider Eugene Debs – the five-time 
Presidential candidate for the Socialist Party of America. We find republican language 
peppering much of his writing and speeches from the first decade after the turn of the century: 
the great mass struggle in economic servitude. The working class are dependent upon 
the capitalist class, who own machines and other means of production; and the latter 
class, by virtue of their economic mastery, are the ruling class of the nation, and it is 
idle under such conditions to claim that men are equal and that all are sovereign citizens. 
No man is free in any just sense who has to rely upon the arbitrary will of another for 
the opportunity to work. Such a man works, and therefore lives, by permission, and this 
is the present economic relation of the working class to the capitalist class.35 
Republican tropes of servitude, dependency, citizenship, and reliance upon the arbitrary will 
of another are unmistakable here. Debs also stressed that political equality was impossible 
while workers lacked economic freedom, again understood as when such a worker “is at the 
mercy of his master since he depends upon his arbitrary will for the opportunity to labor”. Thus, 
he concludes, “a political republic and an economic despotism are incompatible and in 
ceaseless conflict”. 36 
Debs echoes labor republican demands to “engraft republican principles into our 
industrial system”, as well as the attempts of British socialists to characterise economic 
domination by drawing parallels with political autocracy.37 For example, Beatrice and Sidney 
Webb decry “the uncontrolled power wielded by the owners of the means of production”, 
which for the worker meant “a far more genuine loss of liberty, and a far keener sense of 
personal subjection, than the official jurisdiction of the magistrate, or the far-off, impalpable 
rule of the king”.38 This critique is carried forward, in what is sometimes strikingly republican 
language, by later British socialists. R. H. Tawney, for instance, observes that an employer’s 
power over property can ensure that workers “live, in effect, at the will of a lord”, and Philip 
Snowden likewise tells us, “There can be no real liberty so long as men are dependent for their 
means of living upon the goodwill or caprice of a private employer”.39 Socialist republican 
arguments and vocabulary therefore survive well into the twentieth century. 
 
4. Domination and Market Discipline 
We have encountered strong historical grounds for aligning socialist and republican thought, 
especially insofar as republican opposition to subjection to another’s arbitrary will could be 
extended to encompass economic domination rooted in class. But does concentrating narrowly 
on domination risk ignoring one of the central theoretical innovations of Marxism: namely, a 
renewed focus on the impersonal dynamics of capitalism, which supplants a fixation on the 
arbitrary will? Marx observes that “as a whole”, conditions for workers do not “depend on the 
good or ill will of the individual capitalist”, but rather “the inherent laws of capitalist 
production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power over every individual 
capitalist”.40 In the same spirit, Nicholas Vrousalis objects to republican critiques of capitalism 
on the grounds that “domination without arbitrariness” is common in modernity.41 Both 
workers and capitalists are thought to be subject to non-arbitrary wills: those shaped by 
impersonal market imperatives. Similarly, Thompson suggests neo-republicans do not 
sufficiently appreciate “the functional logic of the economy”, whereby workers are “dependent 
less on the individual capitalist than on the structure of extractive power”.42  
Consider a simplified example of such concerns. Owners and managers of private 
companies cannot act entirely at their own discretion indefinitely, since competitive pressures 
will drive them out of business if they are not heavily steered by profit-maximisation. For 
instance, in wage-setting, the need to retain their workforces and maintain long-term 
profitability means that employers cannot act with complete impunity even within the bounds 
of the labour contract and employment laws, since well-functioning markets will punish those 
who either dote upon or drive away staff. 
Does such market discipline render radical republican analyses of capitalist economies 
moot? Not so. There is still room for considerable arbitrary power even within the strictures of 
the market. Writing in 1887 about the condition of women wage-workers in America, the social 
reformer Helen Campbell observed: 
The swarming crowd of applicants are absolutely at the mercy of the manager 
or foreman, who, unless there is a sudden pressure of work, makes the selections 
according to fancy43 
We see some market constraints operating here (“unless there is a sudden pressure of work”) 
but also great discretionary power in the ordinary case, which places these women at the 
foreman’s whim. Republicanism makes good sense of why even those women who do happen 
to be offered work are nonetheless exposed to considerable unfreedom by their precarity. 
 Furthermore, market incentives and deterrents are often flexible: the capitalist might 
decide to take a hit to their economic interests in any solitary case in which they would like to 
impose their will, even if a sustained disregard for market discipline would prove disastrous. 
Nor is it impossible for especially vengeful or incompetent employers to risk the fates of their 
organisations to pursue vendettas or indulge their own vanity. You can buck the market – even 
if you cannot always do so costlessly or systematically. The residual possibility of being 
targeted leaves workers subject to arbitrary power when they could still be at the sharp end of 
their employer’s displeasure in any particular case. 
 Could this be a reason to intensify market discipline until much of this residual 
unaccountable power evaporates? The hope would be to supplant the remaining arbitrary power 
of individual owners and managers of productive property by forcing economic decision-
making to even more closely track faceless market imperatives. Some radical republicans 
would say this simply confronts us with an “impersonal domination embodied in the market” 
afflicting capitalists and workers alike.44 Yet, this risks severing the conceptual connection 
between domination and another agent’s arbitrary will – although the case might still be made 
for viewing “the market as a system for aggregating arbitria”.45 In any case, even if ramping 
up market discipline could eliminate economic domination, this would still come at the cost of 
usurping economic agency from workers.46 Subordinating employer control to market 
competition need not create worker control. Thus, radical republicans should reject this strategy 
all the same. 
 
5. Private Government 
Can radical republicans offer an effective programme to combat economic domination? 
Elizabeth Anderson recapitulates much of the radical republican analysis of economic power 
but recommends milder measures than socialism. She has sought to show how contemporary 
workplaces are subject to regimes of “private government”, which is “government that has 
arbitrary, unaccountable power over those it governs”. 47 Private government in the workplace 
is said to produce a “state of republican unfreedom, of subjection to the arbitrary will of 
another”. 48 Anderson provides a battery of examples showing how this control over workers 
manifests itself: from pressure from employers to support particular political causes and 
candidates, to subjecting retail workers to invasive anti-theft inspections on unpaid time, 
mandating suspicionless drug screening, firing union members, and cracking down on the ‘time 
theft’ represented by casual chatting.49 In response, “The task is to replace private 
government with public government”.50  
Anderson makes a number of proposals for reducing the domination of workers, 
including measures to secure exit options, rule of law, and just workplace constitutions.51 These 
include strong legal presumptions against ‘noncompete’ clauses, which contractually restrict 
workers’ abilities to exit for other jobs in the same industry. Likewise, Anderson proposes 
strengthening analogues of the rule of law and constitutional protections within workplaces, 
through intrafirm complaints procedures, “employee handbooks and standard practice guides 
that streamline authority along legalistic lines”, and basic workplace rights to free speech and 
non-discrimination.52 
While each of these measures would be welcome, there remain grounds for doubting 
their sufficiency. Consider the codification of employer authority in employee handbooks. 
Unless this is accompanied by independently adjudicated sanctions for departing from intrafirm 
procedures, the codification of intrafirm practices will be unlikely to effectively restrain 
managerial power. Furthermore, the ability of managers and owners to revise these procedures 
at will without consulting workers makes them an even flimsier check on arbitrary power. 
These concerns about a lack of independent evaluation, enforcement, and establishment of 
rules internal to firms are echoes of Marx’s criticisms of the “factory code”, through which the 
capitalist exercises “like a private legislator, and at his own good will, his autocracy over his 
workpeople, unaccompanied by that division of responsibility, in other matters so much 
approved of by the bourgeoisie”.53 Similarly, when responsibility for interpreting, 
implementing, and instituting organisational procedures circumscribing managerial power 
rests either in the hands of management themselves or the owners who appointed and can 
dismiss them, then workers do not enjoy an effective analogue of the rule of law. 
Anderson’s most dramatic proposal is for worker participation in management. It aims 
to significantly amplify worker ‘voice’, and so can seem well-placed to rebut our initial 
concerns over excessive concentrations of workplace power in the hands of employers. 
Anderson does not defend any particular model of participation but gestures approvingly 
towards German-style codetermination in which workers are represented on the boards of large 
companies.54 However, a more fundamental shift in the ownership and control of wealth and 
productive property is needed to definitively overturn class domination and worker unfreedom. 
Domination is resilient, and limited support for exit, law, and constitution, even in the context 
of codetermination, will leave much of it untouched. Why is this? 
Codetermination leaves decisive power in the hands of shareholders, with even the 
extensive German Mitbestimmung system giving worker representatives only between a third 
and a little under a half of the votes on the supervisory boards of most large companies.55 No 
individual shareholder acting alone can usually impose their arbitrary will, but shareholders 
acting together around aligned interests will prevail in the boardroom. Sympathetic critics 
admit that “even a minority presence can help strengthen workers’ voice in corporate decision-
making”, but they note that the influence of codetermination institutions like supervisory 
boards and works councils is often limited to employment issues rather than the investment 
and strategy decisions made by separate management boards, such that “the more strategic the 
issue for management, the weaker the powers of the councils”.56  
Shareholders can also use subtler techniques to resist worker control, such as altering 
the capital structure of the firm through debt leveraging, thereby restricting liquidity that 
workers might otherwise attempt to capture for wage rises or other worker-led projects.57 Let 
us imagine a more ambitious system of codetermination can be devised which makes these 
schemes less likely by rebalancing worker and shareholder control. The ownership rights of 
shareholders will nevertheless constitute a hard limit on worker power within codetermining 
firms, with the threat of discretionary capital withdrawal and liquidation able to discipline 
workers.58 Thus, the ownership of firms cannot be easily disentangled from dominating control 
over them. 
While codetermination may modestly increase worker voice within a firm, it does little 
for those outside the organisation when it goes unmatched by wider democratic control over 
the economy. For instance, consumers are still beholden to the decisions of codetermining 
firms, with no more control over the supply of many essential goods and services – which can 
be altered, priced up, or withdrawn arbitrarily – than the incentive provided by access to their 
wallets. Similarly, jobseekers who lack economic independence will remain subject to the 
arbitrary power of managers throughout the process of hiring and contract negotiation. 
Consequently, the further danger with a codetermination-led strategy is not only that it will fail 
to sufficiently check domination internal to the firm, but that it can also leave citizens outside 
the firm at the mercy of those within it. 
 
6. Socialist Means, Republican Ends 
Socialism secures the grounds for a much deeper democratisation of the economy. Public 
ownership of the means of production establishes a stronger authority for transferring power to 
workers and citizens than policies like codetermination do. For instance, it would allow the 
introduction of democratic workplace constitutions which required those in managerial roles 
to be appointed by and be accountable to the rest of the workforce (a measure that existing 
managers, proprietors, and shareholders would doubtless veto under codetermination). The 
rationale for such policies is that managerial domination is held in check to the degree that 
managers are answerable to those over whom they hold power. Public ownership also provides 
an opportunity for a more radical transformation of the internal social structure of workplaces 
to enable workers themselves to assume more autonomy (and not simply to have more say in 
who has authority over them). When private shareholders and owners are displaced, this allows 
a slackening of the relentless pursuit of profit-maximisation – which, in turn, creates greater 
scope for employees to organise their working lives in ways that suit them, rather than being 
subjected to a regime that squeezes the utmost economic value from their time. This second 
strategy does not attempt to make managerial power over workers less arbitrary but rather 
transfers much of this power directly to workers themselves. 
Public ownership of the means of production does not, however, mean there are no 
external pressures on workers. Private shareholders and proprietors are replaced by social 
ownership by the citizenry and other stakeholders, through which democratic authority can be 
exerted. This gives society at large some control over both the goals which are set for an 
industry and the investments it receives. Such a fundamental shift in power would allow the 
focuses of economic life – say, whether to concentrate on climate change mitigation or reducing 
the cost of consumer goods – to be set by the democratic will and not the desires of private 
owners of capital. The citizenry would no longer be subordinated to the whims and interests of 
a capitalist class and could instead set its own direction of economic travel. Furthermore, 
economic surpluses not needed for reinvestment would remain in public hands, and subject to 
democratic authority. These could be used to strengthen health, education, criminal justice, and 
welfare provisions – not only in order to bring direct benefits to citizens, but so as to better 
equip them to resist private domination by partners, relatives, or acquaintances, and public 
domination by officials or other figures with social authority. 
Citizen control over the economy does not have to presuppose high barriers to 
citizenship which would horde economic freedoms for existing citizens and deny them to 
migrants. Even republican thinkers like Hannah Arendt, who notes there is no precedent for 
free and equal relationships which are not “spatially limited”, have observed that this does not 
preclude the establishment of a “community of interest with the oppressed and exploited”, 
which emerges “out of solidarity”, and encompasses “not only the multitude of a class or a 
nation or a people, but eventually all mankind.”59 The civic economic democracy of socialist 
republicanism can share this solidaristic, porous, and inclusive character. 
The core idea driving socialist republicanism is that public ownership of the means of 
production would offer an institutional foundation for widespread freedom without 
domination. Public ownership underpins democratic control, which can be used to ensure that 
access to many of the background conditions necessary to enjoy meaningful citizenship is not 
dependent on the arbitrary will of a particular individual or class. Of course, economic 
democracy is not a panacea.60 Democratic institutions can still be captured by factional interests 
and ride roughshod over minorities, especially in the absence of a broader egalitarian ethos and 
mechanisms for oversight and review. Furthermore, democratic control of the citizenry over 
the economy as a whole can stand in tension with the democratic control of specific groups of 
employees over their own workplaces. Thus, there is a need to think seriously about what 
institutional structures can do sufficient justice to both dimensions of economic 
democratisation.61 It is also important to recognise that a socialist republicanism narrowly 
focused on economic domination is not a sufficient response to domination grounded in gender 
and race, which have distinctive recognitive as well as economic dimensions.62 Nevertheless, 
socialist republicans hold that worker and citizen control of the economy are among the 
fundamental conditions for forestalling endemic personal and structural domination. 
 
7. Property-Owning Democracy 
Is fighting for socialism on republican grounds using a sledgehammer to crack a nut? We might 
think public ownership is unnecessary, and effective social control over wealth is sufficient for 
non-domination. Such control could be achieved by dispersing private ownership widely 
among individuals rather than concentrating it in the hands of a democratic state or community. 
This is the vision animating Rawlsian property-owning democracy, whose background 
institutions are intended to “disperse the ownership of wealth and capital, and thus to prevent 
a small part of society from controlling the economy, and indirectly, political life as well.”63 
Property-owning democracy has also been defended by liberal republicans such as Alan 
Thomas, who tells us that capital-ownership in particular, “increases independence from 
‘undue influence’ and domination by others”.64 These property-owning democrats want to 
spread private wealth widely instead of taking it into public ownership, and they favour an 
initial predistributive diffusion of wealth and human capital over redistribution of incomes. 
Indeed, there is an earlier radical republican precedent for such a position in William James 
Linton’s The English Republic, which attacks “the monstrous relationship of master and 
servant—employer and employed, profitmonger and wages slave”, while simultaneously 
denying that “private property is inevitably a nuisance”.65 He continues: “Our complaint is not 
that there is too much individual property, but that there is too little; not that the few have, but 
that the many have not.”  
Why not, then, opt for property-owning democracy as a method of securing greater 
independence from both private employers and the designs of the state? Firstly, its commitment 
to democracy remains narrowly political, such that Rawls himself observes that a property-
owning democracy does not itself establish workplace democracy.66 Admittedly, nor does it 
preclude democratic control of workplaces secured through private means, such as worker-
owned cooperatives. Yet, as critics of property-owning democracy such as Nien-hê Hsieh point 
out, there are obstacles to forms of democratisation grounded in worker-ownership, especially 
in the context of large-scale or capital-intensive economic enterprises.67 Workers can own some 
share of their workplace while its internal constitution remains undemocratic – earning them 
dividends but little effective control as small stakeholders.  
Even if democratic governance within workplaces is achieved, there are significant 
costs to securing social control over economic life through property-owning democracy rather 
than socialist public ownership. For instance, worker-ownership leaves workers doubly 
exposed to the failure of firms, since they lose much of their capital when they lose their jobs 
– the very time when they would most need to draw on it. The welfare state might still act as a 
social safety net in such cases, but this suggests the dual independence from corporate and state 
power that property-owning democracy was meant to achieve is at best partial. Furthermore, 
worker-ownership crowds out democratic control by the citizenry at large, thereby 
economically disenfranchising those who are retired, informal carers, or unable to work. In 
other words, if control is secured through worker-ownership, then those outside formal 
employment will have significantly less influence over our shared economic life than others. 
Public ownership is a more reliable route to both the socialisation of economic risk and 
democratic control over the productive economy. Similar lessons apply to the socially 
reproductive goods needed to make and remake people. For instance, dispersal of assets 
through widespread private home ownership leaves homeowners individually exposed to the 
vicissitudes of the housing market – including both precipitous declines in asset prices and 
unearned windfalls. Public housing not only avoids these problems but can be planned, 
developed, maintained, and distributed democratically, without housing provision being 
beholden to the wills of those with private capital. Thus, there is good reason to socialise much 
productive and reproductive property alike. 
 
8. Public Domination 
Will socialising rather than dispersing private property simply replace private domination with 
public domination? Jeffrey Reiman warns, “If ownership of means of production is the main 
source of coercive power in a society, Marxists above all should be wary of placing that 
ownership in the hands of any single institution, much less the state with its police and its 
armies.”68 These concerns have also been raised by republican thinkers, with Alan Thomas 
favouring property-owning democracy over market socialism on similar grounds. He tells us 
that “dispersed power supports polyarchic governance and thereby protects individual 
freedom”.69 But the most sustained warnings have come from the commercial republican 
Robert Taylor, who is always quick to remind us that “state domination remains an ever-present 
risk”.70 
Taylor considers whether “the state could try to empower voice directly”, through 
“generally rebalancing economic power in favor of labor”, or “requiring companies to have 
German-style works councils or other forms of labor participation in managerial decisions”.71 
He rejects such policies on the grounds that they “necessarily give a great deal of discretionary 
power to (quasi-)public agents, power that can and will be frequently abused for non-public 
ends.” 72 Taylor’s concern is that using the apparatus of the state to directly quash domination 
– rather than merely increasing exit options within potentially dominating relationships – 
inevitably has the perverse result of intensifying aggregate domination. Thus, in bearing down 
on private domination so directly, we are thought to rely on greater concentrations of publicly 
dominating arbitrary power. Among the dangers that Taylor identifies is the “quasi-public 
power [...] of the state itself in its pursuit of industrial democracy or even associational 
socialism”, and these worries are sure to loom larger still if such a state also holds and controls 
productive property.73 Why, then, think the juggernaut of the state is going to be any less 
dominating than the owners of private capital? 
The most important distinguishing characteristic is the state’s subjection to 
comprehensive democratic control by the citizen body. Neo-republicans have argued that 
democratic governance under a mixed constitution and supported by a vigilant citizenry can 
create conditions for “government that would promote the equal freedom of citizens without 
itself becoming a master in their lives – in other words, that would protect against private forms 
of domination without perpetrating public forms.”74 It is true that political democracy and civic 
contestation render the collective power of citizens over themselves less arbitrary. But we 
cannot rest content with a mere appeal to a democratic republican state and civic culture as a 
bulwark against socialist public domination, since the complex and untidy operations of any 
real state are bound to create countless small enclaves of arbitrary power which are somewhat 
resistant to meaningful democratic oversight and control through centralised state institutions. 
Socialist republicans should not brush these dangers away by adverting to some ideal 
macropolitical constitutional or institutional framework which is supposed to render economic 
domination impossible. Instead, the healthier response is to consider which political and 
economic forms and practices are likely to minimise dominating relationships that might arise 
through a larger economic role for the state, and what measures can be taken to mitigate the 
economic domination that remains. 
The first such measure is to ensure citizens have unconditional access to an economic 
minimum. Someone with an ability to meet their basic material needs which is contingent on 
neither the good will of state nor market actors enjoys significant economic independence, 
which allows them to resist pressure to conform to the designs of others. This could take the 
form of both an unconditional basic income and unconditional basic services, such as 
education, healthcare, and housing.75 The unconditionality of these provisions is important, 
because it reduces the circumstances in which other agents will possess the discretionary power 
to determine whether someone’s fundamental needs are met, and thereby closes down the 
dominating social power this can introduce.76 Even under a highly statist socialism in which 
access to employment and the resources required to pursue productive and reproductive 
economic projects were controlled by a centralised decision-making bureaucracy, then the 
provision of an unconditional economic minimum would act as a significant counterweight to 
potential state domination. 
The second response to the danger of public domination begins by pushing back against 
an overly narrow construal of public ownership which supposes that such a centralised state 
socialism is the only model available. There remains scope for nationalisation of industry and 
infrastructure under socialism, especially where horizontal integration can deliver significant 
efficiencies of scale that redound to the public good. However, the monopolistic and 
monopsonist dangers of such economic concentration cannot be ignored by those socialist 
republicans attentive to the threat of public domination. Socialists have been sensitive to these 
worries, with many rejecting a top-down ‘Morrissonian’ approach to nationalisation whereby 
a government simply appoints an official with instructions to run the nationalised service in the 
public interest.77 Instead, these socialists often recommend forms of nationalisation which 
combine democratic governance by the workforce, the users of the service, and the citizen body 
as a whole – balancing the effective power of several stakeholders who can keep each other's 
potentially dominating power in check.78 Nor is nationalisation itself the only kind of public 
ownership available to socialist republicans. Municipal ownership, community enterprises, and 
development trusts each offer more local forms of public ownership and control over 
productive and reproductive property, which do not concentrate economic authority in the 
hands of central government.79 Socialist republicans can advocate a multiplicity of public 
ownership structures at various scales, while seeking to promote a diverse ecology of state and 
non-state organisations able to disperse power, so that no individual, official, or group amasses 
dangerous levels of unaccountable authority. 
How do we get there from here? The immediate and forceable expropriation of all 
private productive and reproductive property by a socialist republican state is not likely to allay 
fears about public domination. Socialists have proposed alternative models for democratising 
the economy, however, such as the use of ‘public-commons partnerships’, which create 
governance and capitalisation structures for joint economic enterprises that bring together state 
agents, stakeholders from civil society, and members of ‘commons associations’.80 They are 
designed to decentralise democratic control, while ensuring a share of surplus value created 
within them is used to support other such partnerships in a “self-expanding circuit”.81 Other 
incrementalist policies for socialising productive wealth are also available, such as inclusive 
ownership funds, which compel or strongly incentivise private firms to deposit a modest share 
of annual profits, in the form of equity, in worker- or publicly-controlled funds.82 Socialist 
economic programmes along these lines – which solicit support from allied state power without 
pursuing a centralised statist command economy – have the potential to combat private 
economic domination without substituting greater public domination. Likewise, they stand in 
contrast to militant plans for revolutionary cadres to overthrow or seize control of the state. 
Nevertheless, socialist republicans should not be naïve about the forces that would be massed 
against any attempt to socialise vast tracts of private property, and should recognise the need 
to build sufficient social power to repel potentially violent attempts to disrupt their projects.83 
 
9. Conclusion 
Let us recapitulate the case for socialist republicanism. The republican tradition has been 
attacked for its elitism and conservatism – something which we considered under the headings 
of private property, disenfranchisement, and a latter-day support for markets. We saw, 
however, that none were essential features of a recognisable republicanism. Looking to the 
nineteenth-century, it became clear that republican conceptual resources could be turned to 
radical political ends, in the forms of robust socialism or working class cooperativism. Our aim 
has been not only to add a new historical chapter to this story, which shows how the radical 
republican tradition extends into the twentieth century, but to develop a forward-looking 
programmatic account of socialist republicanism. This means confronting a number of 
conceptual and institutional problems that historians of radical republicanism like Gourevitch 
have not addressed at length – such as, the challenge posed by non-republican Marxism, if 
codetermination is sufficient for non-domination, whether radical republicans should embrace 
property-owning democracy, and what forms of public ownership are required to keep 
economic domination at bay. 
The concern that republicanism could not accommodate a cardinal insight of Marxist 
politics – that systemic factors are more important than the human will – was ultimately not 
founded, since arbitrary power still abounds even when people are restrained in other respects 
by impersonal market forces. Distinctively socialist republicanism arises not only from a 
diagnosis of economic domination but a particular programme for combatting it, which is 
rooted in public ownership of productive and reproductive property. The objection that this 
programme is needlessly maximalist and avoids attractive alternatives in codetermination or 
property-owning democracy was rebutted by pointing to democratic deficits in these more 
limited proposals, as well as significant individualisation of economic risk in strategies 
retaining high levels of private property. Finally, we saw that public ownership did not entail 
a publicly dominating concentration of property in the hands of the state, with new institutional 
forms such as public-commons partnerships and inclusive ownership funds allowing a 
decentralisation of democratic control. 
In sum, the case for socialist republicanism is that socialism provides a strong 
institutional basis for combatting domination and that republicanism provides a strong 
conceptual basis for articulating the economic unfreedom rife in capitalist society. How does 
socialism tackle domination? Public ownership of productive property is a vehicle for both 
democratic control over firms and worker control within them. This provides a check on the 
arbitrary power currently held by managers, owners, and shareholders, who have sweeping 
discretion to impose their own will on workers and consumers. Socialist welfare provisions 
also strengthen the hand of non-workers by providing less conditional access to the resources 
and skills needed to resist domination in the home and the public sphere. Conversely, 
republicanism itself provides the theoretical apparatus for diagnosing the threat to freedom 
constituted by arbitrary managerial power and class-based domination. The positive goal of 
achieving a solidaristic and relational economic independence – which ensures that people are 
not thoroughly exposed to the caprice of others in their personal and civic lives – is a worthy 
goal for an emancipatory socialist politics. Thus, socialist republicanism offers a compelling 
analysis of economic life under capitalism and a plausible programme for beginning to rectify 
its flaws. 
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